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I.  INTRODUCTION 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the U.S. Supreme Court declared: 
“That [C]ongress cannot delegate legislative power to the president is a princi-
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ple universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the sys-
tem of government ordained by the constitution.”1  But then came the birth of 
the administrative state amidst the Great Depression – ushering in a new un-
derstanding of the separation of powers that emphasized functionalism over 
formalism.  Accordingly, it has been over eight decades since the U.S. Supreme 
Court found a violation of the non-delegation doctrine, despite countless chal-
lenges to statutes that have included almost limitless delegations.  Outside of 
scholarly debate, that universally recognized principle vital to constitutional 
government seems to be a dead letter. 
An autopsy of federal non-delegation jurisprudence reveals an interesting 
insight: the Supreme Court has never repudiated the theoretical underpinnings 
of the non-delegation doctrine or questioned its importance in maintaining the 
separation of powers.  Instead, the Court has whittled the non-delegation doc-
trine down to a nub because of practical concerns with implementing it.  First, 
the Court has stated that there is an insurmountable line-drawing problem that 
occurs when delineating a permissible delegation from an impermissible one.2  
And second, the Court has asserted that the non-delegation doctrine cannot be 
seriously enforced in a complex, modern society without disastrous conse-
quences.3  I argue that both of those problems are real but can be mitigated by 
a non-delegation test that emphasizes the primacy of the legislature in lawmak-
ing, and there are two existing models of a better way that the Court can choose 
from.  A compromise solution pioneered by the civil non-delegation jurispru-
dence of Florida shows that the doctrine can be flexible while still limiting 
vacuous delegations.4  Alternatively, Florida’s criminal non-delegation juris-
prudence and opinions by two leading federal jurists promote strict formalism 
when the delegation at issue provides the executive with authority to define a 
crime.5  This latter approach allows for an experiment by federal courts that 
would limit to the criminal context renewed non-delegation enforcement. 
In Part II, I address the line-drawing problem the U.S. Supreme Court has 
backed itself into by formulating a toothless non-delegation test.  Currently, 
the Court simply asks whether there is an intelligible principle underlying the 
delegation.6  Unsurprisingly, no statutes fail that low bar, and it is a bar that the 
Court has lowered even further over time.  The historical non-delegation test 
devised by Chief Justice John Marshall was used for over a century in federal 
jurisprudence before being abandoned for the intelligible principle test.7  While 
the Marshall test does not wholly resolve line-drawing problems, some states 
 
 1. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892). 
 2. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). 
 3. Id. at 372 (majority opinion). 
 4. See infra Part II.B. 
 5. See infra Part V.A. 
 6. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372. 
 7. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42–43 (1825); J.W. Hampton, 
Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (establishing the “intelligible 
principle” test). 
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have adopted and applied the Marshall test with considerable success, showing 
that the line-drawing concerns are overblown.8  Florida, in particular, has been 
able to consistently apply the non-delegation doctrine by asking whether a 
given statute makes the fundamental and primary policy decision,9 which is 
similar to the Marshall test’s inquiry.  California, on the other hand, adopted 
the Marshall test but has applied it erroneously and undermined the rule of law 
justifications for enforcing the non-delegation doctrine.10 
Most of the recent federal delegation jurisprudence contends that it is im-
practical to enforce the non-delegation doctrine in a complex society.  Part III 
argues that the problem with this line of reasoning is that the Court presupposes 
that the non-delegation doctrine must be administered in one rigid way in all 
contexts.  I rely on Florida case law to show that assumption is false.  As noted 
above, Florida courts have adopted a sliding scale approach in their non-dele-
gation jurisprudence, so where a statute deals with very technical issues, like 
cost-recovery mechanisms for nuclear power plants, the courts give the legis-
lature more leeway to delegate broadly.11  Furthermore, the test can become 
more stringent in some contexts, such as when a legislature delegates crime-
making authority to an executive agency.  The Marshall test, as applied and 
fleshed out in Florida, thus proves to be rather elastic. 
Florida’s imperfect application of the Marshall test raises some genuine 
problems.  In Part IV, I respond to the notion that Florida’s version of the Mar-
shall test gives judges too much discretion.  Though I recognize that Florida’s 
non-delegation jurisprudence has flaws, it is nevertheless a step in the right 
direction and superior to the current federal approach.  Florida’s approach at 
least takes care of easy cases and thus provides some constraint on the most 
vacuous delegations. 
In Part V, I discuss Florida’s non-delegation enforcement in the criminal 
context, as well as opinions by Judge Jeff Sutton and then-Judge Neil Gorsuch 
on delegations to the executive to define crimes.  Florida case law adheres to 
strict formalism for delegations involving criminal penalties, and Judge Sutton 
and Justice Gorsuch echo that approach.  Though there are benefits to follow-
ing the Florida civil enforcement approach as a compromise between formal-
ists and functionalists, I conclude that federal courts should adopt the approach 
of Florida, Judge Sutton, and Justice Gorusch for delegations involving defin-
ing crimes.  The importance of getting the law right and acting on sure-footed 
authority is at its peak when the State takes away life or liberty, so enforcing 
the non-delegation doctrine to protect criminal defendants is worth the effort 
of fleshing out the doctrine.  But only enforcing the non-delegation doctrine in 
the criminal context would also provide federal courts with an experiment, al-
lowing the judiciary to develop law in a limited setting before either expanding 
 
 8. See infra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 9. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 925 (Fla. 1978). 
 10. See infra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 11. See S. All. for Clean Energy v. Graham, 113 So. 3d 742, 750 (Fla. 2013) (per 
curiam). 
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it to civil delegations also or confining it to just the criminal sphere.  Ulti-
mately, state constitutional law and the opinions of a couple of thoughtful fed-
eral jurists provide interesting models for how the federal judiciary can revital-
ize non-delegation enforcement.  Only the U.S. Supreme Court has the power 
to reverse course and return to a faithful adherence of our government’s com-
mitment to the separation of powers. 
II.  LINE-DRAWING CONCERNS, THE MARSHALL TEST, AND FLORIDA 
In Mistretta, Justice Antonin Scalia argued in dissent that “while the doc-
trine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a fundamental element 
of our constitutional system, it is not an element readily enforceable by the 
courts.”12  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in a subsequent case, reiter-
ated that point, stating, “[W]e have ‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess 
Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left 
to those executing or applying the law.’”13  In essence, the Court is acknowl-
edging that it is too difficult to draw a clear line delineating permissible from 
impermissible delegations.  As described by one scholar, the Court refuses to 
“tackle the line-drawing problem” inherent in the non-delegation doctrine for 
fear of “unleashing a parade of horribles.”14 
The Court’s fears are legitimate but overblown.  The Court demands both 
too much and too little from the non-delegation doctrine.  The demand is too 
much when the Court implicitly assumes that it can draw a line in one case and 
have it hold in every case thereafter.  But that would be impossible, and that 
expectation is not used to defeat enforcement in other contexts.  As the Chief 
Justice noted in NFIB v. Sebelius, for example, “We have no need to fix a line 
. . . . It is enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is surely 
beyond it.”15  The Court demands too little, though, when it wholly defers to 
Congress to decide how much of its legislative power it can relinquish to an-
other branch, especially to the executive. 
Both errors can be resolved by looking to federal non-delegation history 
and to Florida’s non-delegation jurisprudence.  Federal non-delegation history 
reveals that Chief Justice Marshall formulated a workable and enforceable test, 
but the test was later abandoned for the misunderstood intelligible principle 
formula.16  Then-Justice Rehnquist sought to revive the non-delegation doc-
 
 12. 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 13. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001) (quoting Mis-
tretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 14. Steven F. Huefner, The Supreme Court’s Avoidance of the Nondelegation 
Doctrine in Clinton v. City of New York: More Than “A Dime’s Worth of Difference,” 
49 CATH. U. L. REV. 337, 415 (2000). 
 15. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012). 
 16. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.A.3. 
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trine after it had been long dormant, advocating in the process for a test com-
parable to the Marshall test.17  Florida state courts have also utilized a test func-
tionally equivalent to the Marshall test in enforcing the non-delegation doc-
trine.18 
Developing a good test is the first step in achieving consistent outcomes 
for delegation challenges.  Therefore, the following section focuses on the tests 
that the U.S. Supreme Court and Florida courts have utilized.  As discussed 
below, Florida has developed a fairly stable non-delegation jurisprudence be-
cause its test is harder to manipulate than the intelligible principle test.  While 
the Florida Supreme Court’s test is functionally equivalent to the Marshall test, 
Florida courts have more fully imbued the test with content, and thus, the two 
tests should be merged to provide a fuller template for contemporary federal 
courts.  Regardless of how one characterizes the test used in Florida, that state’s 
jurisprudence provides substantial evidence that courts can enforce the non-
delegation doctrine reasonably consistently – with no subsequent parade of 
horribles – thus rebutting the U.S. Supreme Court’s primary reason for not en-
forcing it. 
A.  Federal Non-Delegation Test 
1.  The Marshall Test and Schoenbrod’s Definition of Legislative 
Power 
 
In 1825, Chief Justice Marshall enunciated the basic idea “that Congress 
can[not] delegate . . . powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative.”19  
He then articulated a non-delegation test distinguishing important subjects 
from lesser ones: 
The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important 
subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from 
those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and 
power given to those who are to act under such general provisions to 
fill up the details.20 
Leading administrative law scholar Gary Lawson has interpreted Chief Justice 
Marshall’s test to mean that “Congress must make whatever decisions are im-
portant enough to the statutory scheme in question so that Congress must make 
them.”21 
 
 17. See infra Part II.A.6. 
 18. See infra Part II.B. 
 19. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825). 
 20. Id. at 43. 
 21. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 361 
(2002). 
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At first glance, there is a slight ambiguity concerning Professor Lawson’s 
interpretation of Marshall’s test.  The Marshall test seems to create two classes 
of legislation.  One class contains “important” objects and must be entirely 
regulated by Congress.22  It is not immediately obvious what that means, but 
in M’Culloch v. Maryland, Marshall cites the power to regulate commerce as 
an example of a “great” power.23  We might then assume he means that exer-
tions of great powers should be subject to a strict non-delegation rule, while 
lesser powers require only a “general provision” that can leave it to another 
entity “to fill up the details.”24  One enumerated power, not mentioned by Mar-
shall in M’Culloch as a great power, is the power to establish post offices, pos-
sibly an example of a lesser power. 
If that is a proper elucidation of Marshall’s test, the glaring problem is 
that there is no basis in the Constitution for differentiation between important 
and lesser powers.  But Marshall himself implicitly recognized this in M’Cul-
loch; he argued that a constitution “requires, that only its great outlines should 
be marked, its important objects designated,”25 implying that all enumerated 
powers are great and important.  If that is so, then the Vesting Clause of Article 
I’s stipulation that Congress only possesses the powers enumerated in the Con-
stitution means that Congress cannot delegate any of its powers.  Marshall 
therefore must not have been creating two classes of legislation based on the 
type of legislation but rather demanding that the “important subjects” within a 
statute “be entirely regulated by the legislature itself,” and the legislature can 
then delegate gap-filling duties to others.26  In short, only Congress can exer-
cise the legislative powers of Article I. 
But how can one make sense of Marshall’s statement that “a general pro-
vision may be made” regarding subjects “of less interest,” such that “power 
given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the de-
tails”?27  The answer is that, while only Congress can exercise the powers af-
forded to it by the Constitution, the Marshall test permits Congress to delegate 
non-legislative power.  The next step in articulating a complete non-delegation 
test, therefore, is to define legislative power for the purposes of an unconstitu-
tional delegation. 
Professor David Schoenbrod has proposed a “qualitative” approach to the 
non-delegation doctrine that necessarily defines legislative power.28  Perhaps 
the simplest way to define his approach is to contrast it with what it is not: a 
quantitative non-delegation test asks how much power is too much for Con-
 
 22. Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43. 
 23. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
 24. Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43. 
 25. M’Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407. 
 26. See Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43. 
 27. See id. 
 28. David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Sub-
stance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1249–52 (1984). 
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gress to constitutionally cede.  Under Professor Schoenbrod’s qualitative ap-
proach, on the other hand, even a smidgen of legislative power is too much to 
delegate because delegating legislative power itself is categorically forbid-
den.29  As argued above, I believe the proper understanding of Marshall’s test 
in Wayman also forbids the delegation of any legislative power while allowing 
delegation of non-legislative, or “lesser,” powers to fill up the details in legis-
lation. 
Because Professor Schoenbrod favors a categorical test for the non-dele-
gation doctrine, he must define his categories – namely, legislative power and 
non-legislative power.  Borrowing from the political theory of Friedrich Hayek, 
Professor Schoenbrod defines legislative power as “[p]romulgating rules of 
private conduct.”30  The distinction is thus between instances where the gov-
ernment regulates private conduct and where it regulates itself.  Again follow-
ing Hayek, Professor Schoenbrod sees no liberty concern where the federal 
government manages public property according to ad hoc commands rather 
than rules.31  Another aspect of his definition of legislative power is that inter-
pretation and application of rules governing private conduct are not exercises 
of legislative power.32  That leaves the basic judicial and executive functions 
intact, even though there can be equally reasonable constructions of a rule that 
severely change its scope. 
Professor Schoenbrod proposes that whether a statute passes muster under 
a delegation challenge should depend on whether or not it is a goals statute or 
a rules statute.33  Rules statutes demarcate permissible from impermissible con-
duct, while goals statutes “state goals, which usually conflict, and delegate the 
job of reconciling any such conflicts to others.”34  Goals statutes thus neces-
sarily delegate legislative power because reconciling competing goals is a task 
for the policy-making branch of government.  If, for example, a statute pre-
scribed a particular schedule of tax rates, then it would be a rules statute be-
cause the text of the statute itself would distinguish permissible from imper-
missible conduct.35  By contrast, a statute that empowered the IRS Commis-
sioner to collect a certain amount of money by imposing taxes as necessary 
would be a goals statute.36 
Rules statutes also have goals, but “the goals in a rules statute are not the 
legislative act.”37  The entire point of enacting rules statutes is to avoid the 
 
 29. Id. at 1251. 
 30. Id. at 1250, 1252. 
 31. Id. at 1250–51. 
 32. Id. at 1250. 
 33. Id. at 1253. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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purposivist methods of interpretation that often are indistinguishable from pol-
icy debates had in Congress.38  Professor Schoenbrod sees three additional ben-
efits to statutory interpretation from rules statutes.39  First, rules statutes pro-
vide easy answers in the most typical cases.40  Goals statutes can dispose of 
easy cases, too, but easy cases are less prevalent.41  For example, if a statute 
provides that an employee has a “reasonable amount of time” to appeal a deci-
sion from the EEOC, then a judge can readily conclude an appeal filed three 
days after the adverse EEOC decision is within a reasonable time.  But what 
about sixty days?  One hundred eighty days?  Three years?  By contrast, a 
statute that provides for an appeal within forty-five days of an adverse decision 
will obviously be much easier to apply – indeed, such statutes operate mechan-
ically. 
Second, the decisions made by the legislature in crafting rules give a more 
definite sense of the legislature’s intentions than a mere listing of goals.42  In a 
goals statute, the legislature can list endless goals and give no sense of their 
relative weight or hierarchy.43  But a rules statute requires that the legislature 
make tradeoffs in specifying rules, and a judge can discern (albeit imperfectly) 
what the legislature prioritized in the statute.44  Fundamentally, rules statutes 
should be easier to interpret and should better reflect the intentions of the leg-
islator because rules statutes contain more definite textual clues. 
Third, the basis for stare decisis is stronger for rules statutes.45  When a 
difficult case arises that is not clearly answered by the text of the statute, a court 
must do its best to decide on the applicability of the statute.  Stare decisis re-
duces the amount of difficult cases for a given statute because, over time, in-
tervening court decisions should fill the cracks in a statute.  Stare decisis thus 
leads to more predictability for the public.  But if a judge is tasked with bal-
ancing many contradictory goals, then there is less of a reason to follow the 
outcome in a previous similar case.  No two cases are factually similar in all 
respects, and even if they were, times change and the relative importance of 
policies changes accordingly.  In 1978, for example, it may have been more 
important to interpret an environmental statute narrowly to encourage further 
energy production, while in 2016, it likely is more important to interpret the 
same statute broadly to protect environmental concerns and provide less of an 
emphasis on lowering energy costs.  A rules statute should provide a discerni-
ble preference for environmental concern or energy production, and because 
that preference should be reasonably evident from the text, changing circum-
stances do not limit its application to future cases. 
 
 38. See id. at 1253–54. 
 39. Id. at 1258. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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But Schoenbrod appears to stray from his formalism at one point.  He 
argues “a statute that outlawed ‘unreasonable’ pollution could be considered a 
rules statute in a society with a clear understanding of what constituted unrea-
sonable pollution.”46  A statute that distinguishes permissible from impermis-
sible conduct is what distinguishes a rules statute from a goals statute.47  I am 
less inclined to think that a statute proscribing unreasonable pollution is a rules 
statute, even where custom fixes the meaning of unreasonable.  Because laws 
are difficult to repeal, the custom is likely to be outlasted by the statute.  A 
solution to that problem is to allow courts to invalidate a statute once the cus-
tom fades and the delegation fails to delineate impermissible conduct.  But per-
mitting the same statute to be constitutional one day and unconstitutional the 
next is contrary to the formalism that underpins strong enforcement of the non-
delegation doctrine and seeks to cabin judicial policy-making disguised as stat-
utory interpretation.  A more effective solution would be to allow such a dele-
gation in a statute with a fairly short sunset provision – say, of five or ten years 
– but to invalidate the statute where it would continue indefinitely to be law.  
Additionally, Schoenbrod admits that customary terms of art specific in one 
context but general in others have been used as precedent to support concluding 
that a goals statute is a rules statute.48  In any event, Schoenbrod’s view would 
make the delegation test substantially stricter than federal law has evolved to 
become. 
2.  Contingent Legislation Under the Marshall Test 
Professor Lawson argues that the Marshall test is the best way to explain 
why certain kinds of contingent legislation have been upheld since the begin-
ning of the republic.49  Contingent legislation prescribes a triggering event 
upon which a law takes effect.50  Professor Lawson cites Marshall Field & Co. 
v. Clark as a straightforward example of contingent legislation.51  Under the 
contested law in Marshall Field, the President had a duty to suspend free-trade 
provisions with a country if “he ascertained the fact that duties and exactions 
reciprocally unequal and unreasonable were imposed upon the agricultural or 
other products of the United States.”52  The Marshall Field Court emphasized 
that the President made no determination regarding the “expediency or the just 
operation” of the legislation.53  In other words, because the President had a duty 
to suspend the provisions once he found certain facts, he was simply executing 
a law rather than determining whether a law should be executed. 
 
 46. Id. at 1255. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1259–60, 1269. 
 49. Lawson, supra note 21, at 365–66. 
 50. Id. at 363. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693 (1892). 
 53. Id. 
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While Marshall Field was decided many years after the Marshall test was 
articulated, contingent legislation has been consistently upheld since 1813.54  
The Court has correctly upheld contingent legislation because deducing what 
constitutes a contingency and determining the facts that the contingency de-
pends upon are “core executive and judicial functions.”55  Contingent legisla-
tion therefore does not implicate the lawmaking power because the President 
is not given “standardless discretion.”56  Lawson acknowledges that sometimes 
the determination of whether a contingency occurs can necessitate the type of 
judgment that comes closer to lawmaking.57  The determination of “unequal 
and unreasonable” trade restrictions in Marshall Field is an example where 
reasonable people can differ on whether that is an executive function,58 which 
explains why there was a dissent.  The dissent in Marshall Field argued that 
the President was exercising discretionary lawmaking powers.59  Nevertheless, 
contingent legislation withstands the Marshall test when the “important sub-
ject” is specified in the enacted statute.60 
3.  Beyond Contingent Legislation 
In the 1928 case J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, the Supreme 
Court articulated the standard that still nominally applies today.61  The Court 
stated that Congress must enact laws containing “an intelligible principle to 
which the person or body authorized to [execute the law] is directed to con-
form.”62  While the intelligible principle test is important, Professor Lawson 
notes that another significant aspect of J.W. Hampton is that it went “beyond 
Field by permitting a scheme in which the President actually adjusts the tariff 
rates rather than merely determin[ing] whether pre-existing, congressionally-
specified tariff schedules will take effect.”63 
Professor Lawson rightly asserts that “there need not be an unbridgeable 
gap” between the intelligible principle test and the Marshall test.64  In J.W. 
Hampton, the President was constrained by the direction “to alter the amount 
of a duty on certain imported merchandise in order to ‘equalize the . . . costs of 
production.’”65  The discretion therefore was not devoid of standards, though 
 
 54. Lawson, supra note 21, at 363–64. 
 55. Id. at 364. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 364–65. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 699–700 (1892) (Lamar, J., dis-
senting). 
 60. Lawson, supra note 21, at 365. 
 61. 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); Lawson, supra note 21, at 368. 
 62. J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409. 
 63. Lawson, supra note 21, at 368. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 315, 42 Stat. 
858, 941 (repealed 1930)). 
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it was somewhat nebulous.  Also, there was no single triggering event, unlike 
the determination of unequal and unreasonable trade restrictions.66  Further-
more, there was no single dictated response to the contingency, unlike the sus-
pension of free trade provisions.67  The discretion given to the President was 
thus a double increase: he was allowed more discretion to use the delegated 
power, and his use of the delegated power was less restricted.  As noted by 
Professor Lawson, the difference between the delegations in Marshall Field 
and J.W. Hampton was one of degree and not of kind, but the difference in 
degree was nevertheless substantial.68 
4.  Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry 
In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, the Supreme Court invalidated a dele-
gation to the President.69  In particular, an oil refining company (among others) 
challenged the constitutionality of section 9(c) of the National Industrial Re-
covery Act (“NIRA”), which stated in part: 
The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate 
and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced 
or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be pro-
duced or withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation 
or order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or 
other duly authorized agency of a State.70 
Section 10(a) authorized the President “‘to prescribe such rules and regulations 
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes’ of title 1 of the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act.”71  The Secretary of the Interior promulgated regulations 
carrying out the President’s orders pursuant to the NIRA.72  The regulations 
required producers, purchasers, shippers, and refiners of petroleum to file 
monthly statements including various types of information, such as an attesta-
tion that no amount of petroleum in excess of the amount permitted by the state 
authority was produced.73  The President claimed in an executive order that the 
regulations were issued under Title 1 of the NIRA.74 
The Court began by noting that it looks at whether there is a congression-
ally declared policy “with respect to [the] subject [at issue]; whether the Con-
gress has set up a standard for the President’s action; whether the Congress has 
required any finding by the President in the exercise of the authority to enact 
 
 66. See id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. at 367–69. 
 69. 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935). 
 70. Id. at 406, 410–11. 
 71. Id. at 407 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 710(a) (1934)). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 408. 
 74. Id. at 408–09. 
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the prohibition.”75  Finding that the statute in section 9(c) did not specify (1) 
circumstances or conditions that allowed the President to regulate petroleum 
transportation, (2) criteria to guide the President’s course of petroleum trans-
portation regulation, or (3) any required findings that enabled the President to 
regulate petroleum transportation, the Court stated that section 9(c) “thus de-
clares no policy as to the transportation of the excess production [of petro-
leum].”76  Further, the statute, the Court determined, gave “the President an 
unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition, or 
not to lay it down, as he may see fit.”77 
Because the Court found no policy contained in section 9(c), the Court 
looked to Title 1 as part of the “context” to see if it “furnishe[d] a declaration 
of policy or a standard of action.”78  The first section of Title 1 contained a 
“declaration of policy.”79  The Court determined that the declaration’s “general 
outline of policy” contained nothing regarding the circumstances or conditions 
wherein the President should prohibit the transportation of petroleum and noth-
ing limiting regulations relating to production either.80  In conclusion, the Court 
stated that “this broad outline is simply an introduction of the act, leaving the 
legislative policy as to particular subjects to be declared and defined, if at all, 
by the subsequent sections.”81  Section 9(c) thus “commit[ed] to the President 
the functions of a Legislature rather than those of an executive or administra-
tive officer executing a declared legislative policy.”82  Subsequent sections 
contained no limitations either.83 
The issue, the Court emphasized, is not whether the President will act in 
the “public good” because “[t]he point is not one of motives, but of constitu-
tional authority, for which the best of motives is not a substitute.”84  Noting 
that the underlying issue “has a much wider application” than that involved in 
the case, the Court warned that if the delegation at issue were upheld, Congress 
could then delegate the power to create policy to anyone.85  The Vesting Clause 
of Article I of the Constitution means that “Congress manifestly is not permit-
ted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with 
which it is thus vested.”86  The non-delegation doctrine, however, is not inflex-
ible, but rather the Court conceded “legislation must often be adapted to com-
plex conditions involving a host of details with which the national Legislature 
 
 75. Id. at 415. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 416. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 417–18. 
 81. Id. at 418. 
 82. Id. at 418–19. 
 83. Id. at 419–20. 
 84. Id. at 420. 
 85. Id. at 420–21. 
 86. Id. at 421. 
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cannot deal directly.”87  The Court stated the non-delegation analytical frame-
work as follows: 
The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress 
the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable 
it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing stand-
ards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordi-
nate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to 
which the policy as declared by the Legislature is to apply.88 
Interestingly, the Court did not expressly rely upon the intelligible principle 
test from J.W. Hampton.  In fact, the Court only referred to the test once, and 
it was in the Court’s recitation of the non-delegation doctrine’s history.89  
While tracing the history, the Court characterized the Marshall test as requiring 
Congress to “establish primary standards, devolving upon others the duty to 
carry out the declared legislative policy” and then quoted Marshall.90  Looking 
to the “four corners of the statute,”91 the Court concluded that section 9(c) vi-
olated the non-delegation doctrine because “Congress has declared no policy, 
has established no standard, has laid down no rule.”92  In effect, the Court ap-
plied the Marshall test because it looked for the important policy decision to be 
made in the statute.  When it could find no such policy decision, it invalidated 
the delegation.93 
Not surprisingly, the Court followed the Panama Refining analytical 
framework in Schechter Poultry.94  Only three points from Schechter Poultry 
need to be highlighted.  First, the belief by Congress “that more or different 
power is necessary” to achieve certain goals is insufficient to endow “extra-
constitutional authority” because such assertions of power “were anticipated 
and precluded by the explicit terms of the Tenth Amendment.”95  This is nota-
ble because it implies that the Tenth Amendment provides further and inde-
pendent constitutional support for the non-delegation doctrine.  The importance 
is limited, though, because no other federal court seems to run with this reading 
of the amendment.  Second, like in Panama Refining, the Court emphasized 
that “we look to the statute to see whether Congress [violated the non-delega-
tion doctrine.]”96  Here, we again see that the quest for an important policy 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 429–30. 
 90. Id. at 426. 
 91. Id. at 431. 
 92. Id. at 430. 
 93. Id. 
 94. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529–31 
(1935). 
 95. Id. at 528–29. 
 96. Id. at 530. 
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decision is limited to the statutory text, rather than also inquiring into legisla-
tive history. 
Finally, because a code of fair competition in the live poultry industry 
was challenged, the Court inquired into whether the term “fair competition” 
had a unique definition in the law or whether its definition was wholly within 
the discretion of those formulating the code.97  As an initial matter, the Court 
noted that “[t]he act does not define ‘fair competition.’”98  While the term “un-
fair competition” had a well-established reservoir of meaning at common law, 
the Court determined that even “in its widest range, ‘unfair competition,’ as it 
has been understood in the law, does not reach the objectives of the codes 
which are authorized by the National Industrial Recovery Act.”99  Conse-
quently, the term was broad and new.100  The inquiry into the meaning of fair 
competition demonstrates that the Court was not too demanding in its delega-
tion analysis.  If “fair competition” was a term of art, though not defined in the 
statute, the Court was prepared to uphold the statute.101  After applying the 
analysis of Panama Refining, the Court concluded that the delegation was sim-
ilarly unconstitutional.102 
5.  No Limits 
In 1935, the Court twice invalidated statutes for excessive delegations.103  
Since then, however, the Court has upheld the statute in every delegation chal-
lenge it has considered, including statutes where the delegations were remark-
ably broad.  In Yakus v. United States, for example, the Court upheld a delega-
tion to the Price Administrator to fix commodity prices that would effectuate 
the purposes of the Emergency Price Control Act and that would be fair and 
equitable.104  In Lichter v. United States, the Court upheld a delegation of au-
thority to determine “excessive profits.”105  American Power & Light Co. v. 
SEC106 and National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,107 which are worth an 
extra word of explanation, are particularly emblematic of the no-limits era ush-
ered in by the Court in the 1940s. 
In American Power & Light, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 
1935 delegated to the SEC the power “to ensure that the corporate structure or 
continued existence of any company in a particular holding company system 
 
 97. Id. at 530–31. 
 98. Id. at 531. 
 99. Id. at 531–32. 
 100. Id. at 534. 
 101. Id. at 530. 
 102. Id. at 542. 
 103. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 104. 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944). 
 105. 334 U.S. 742, 785–86, 789 (1948). 
 106. 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946). 
 107. 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943). 
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does not ‘unduly or unnecessarily complicate the structure’ or ‘unfairly or in-
equitably distribute voting power among security holders.’”108  Because that 
delegation was not further defined in the statute, the challengers asserted that 
the words were “legally meaningless.”109  And following Schechter Poultry, 
the delegation purportedly subjected regulated entities to the “unlimited whim” 
and “unfettered discretion” of the SEC because the words also were “no[t] his-
torically defined concepts.”110  Relying on cases like Yakus and Sunshine An-
thracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,111 the Court upheld the “broad” delegation chal-
lenged because the “necessities of modern legislation dealing with complex 
economic and social problems” require such broad delegations.112 
In National Broadcasting, the Court upheld the especially broad delega-
tion to the FCC of the power to regulate broadcast licensing as “public interest, 
convenience, or necessity” require.113  The Court relied on an earlier case114 
challenging the public interest standard.115  In that earlier case, the Court re-
jected the notion that the standard was so vague as to confer unlimited power: 
The requirement is to be interpreted by its context, by the nature of radio 
transmission and reception, by the scope, character, and quality of ser-
vices, and, where an equitable adjustment between states is in view, by 
the relative advantages in service which will be enjoyed by the public 
through the distribution of facilities.  In making such an adjustment the 
equities of existing stations undoubtedly demand consideration.  They 
are not to be the victims of official favoritism.  But the weight of the 
evidence as to these equities and all other pertinent facts is for the de-
termination of the commission in exercising its authority to make a fair 
and equitable allocation.116 
These considerations do not appear in the text of the statute but rather seem to 
have been invented by the Court.117  Moreover, at the end of the passage, the 
Court signals that it will not even guarantee that the Federal Radio Commission 
(“FRC”) expressly takes into account the enumerated considerations because 
the equitable and factual analyses that constitute the decision (about modifying 
 
 108. 329 U.S. at 104 (quoting Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 
687, § 11, 49 Stat. 820, 821 (repealed 2005)). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. 310 U.S. 381 (1940). 
 112. Am. Power & Light, 329 U.S. at 105. 
 113. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943). 
 114. Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortg. Co. (Station WIBO), 289 
U.S. 266 (1933). 
 115. Nat’l Broad., 319 U.S. at 226. 
 116. Nelson Bros., 289 U.S. at 285 (internal quotations omitted). 
 117. See Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 14, 44 Stat. 1168 (repealed 1934).  Indeed, 
there is no authority cited anywhere in or immediately after the quotation.  See Nelson 
Bros., 289 U.S. at 285. 
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a broadcast license)118 belong to the FRC.  In short, the Court invented re-
strictions on the public interest standard and then declined any authority to en-
force those restrictions.  The effect of such cases is that the non-delegation 
doctrine was wholly defanged. 
6.  Rehnquist’s Attempted Revival and Thomas’s Progression 
In the early 1980s, then-Justice Rehnquist sought to reinvigorate the non-
delegation doctrine by using a framework like the Marshall test to scrutinize 
delegations.119  In American Petroleum Institute, the statutory provision at is-
sue was section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 
which states that, in regulating toxic materials and harmful physical agents, the 
Secretary of Labor 
shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent fea-
sible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will 
suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such 
employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard 
for the period of his working life.120 
Justice Rehnquist sought “to reshoulder the burden of ensuring that Con-
gress itself make the critical policy decisions.”121  He then criticized Congress 
for “simply avoiding a choice which was both fundamental for purposes of the 
statute and yet politically so divisive that the necessary decision or compromise 
was difficult, if not impossible, to hammer out in the legislative forge.”122  Jus-
tice Rehnquist then, in near summary of the Marshall test, articulated the need 
for the political accountability provided by the non-delegation doctrine.  He 
argued that the “hard choices” must be made by elected officials when it comes 
to “fundamental policy” because “the buck stops with Congress.”123 
The intelligible principle test need not be irreconcilable with the Marshall 
test.  As it has been applied since the New Deal, however, the intelligible prin-
ciple test has been drained of all its substance.  If, since J.W. Hampton, the 
Court had instead asked the question that Justice Rehnquist asked in Industrial 
Union – whether Congress has made the fundamental policy decision – there 
can be no doubt that the overly broad delegations in Lichter and National 
Broadcast, for example, would have been invalidated.  Justice Rehnquist, 
though, did not demand that Congress enact every detail of a policy into law, 
 
 118. Nelson Bros., 289 U.S. at 285. 
 119. See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671 
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 120. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 
6, 84 Stat. 1590, 1594 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5)). 
 121. Id. at 687. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
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as indicated by his comment that Congress does not have to fill gaps in stat-
utes.124  As further noted by Justice Rehnquist, those who ultimately pay for 
the Court’s timidity are not the institutions of Congress or administrative agen-
cies, but the people, who are left subject to control by distant authorities that 
they themselves have little control over.125 
The only Supreme Court Justice since Rehnquist to question the Court’s 
application of the intelligible principle test is Justice Thomas.  Justice Thomas 
has argued that “the Constitution does not speak of ‘intelligible principles.’  
Rather, it speaks in much simpler terms[ of vesting all legislative powers in the 
Congress].”126  Justice Thomas went on to note that he was “not convinced” 
that the intelligible principle test prevented “all cessions of legislative power” 
and that delegations could have an intelligible principle but be “too great” to 
be anything other than legislative.127  Justice Thomas rightly attacks the intel-
ligible principle for having much too high of a threshold to actually invalidate 
any delegations, as no statute has ever been invalidated while applying the in-
telligible principle test.  But he also subtly endorses the Marshall test.  By not-
ing that sometimes a “delegated decision is simply too great” to allow the leg-
islature to delegate it, he is effectively arguing that there are some “important 
subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself.”128 
In Department of Transportation v. Ass’n of American Railroads, Justice 
Thomas took the next step and advocated for a non-delegation test that com-
bines the Marshall test with Professor Schoenbrod’s qualitative approach.129  
Justice Thomas began his argument by asserting that “[t]he allocation of pow-
ers in the Constitution is absolute,”130 before trudging through the English and 
American history of delegating power to the executive.131  After detailing that 
history, Justice Thomas noted that allowing the intelligible principle test to per-
mit any delegation of policy judgment to the executive “divorce[s] that test 
from its history.”132  The original meaning of the non-delegation doctrine, ac-
cording to Justice Thomas, is that the federal government “may create gener-
ally applicable rules of private conduct only through the proper exercise of leg-
islative power.”133  It is not surprising that Justice Thomas repeats Professor 
Schoenbrod’s understanding, as he cites his work several times.134  Though he 
did not win over any of his fellow Justices, Justice Thomas has taken up – and 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. at 686–87. 
 126. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, 
J., concurring). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Compare id., with Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825). 
 129. 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240–50 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 130. Id. at 1241. 
 131. Id. at 1242–45. 
 132. Id. at 1251. 
 133. Id. at 1252. 
 134. Id. at 1247, 1249 n.6. 
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indeed, strengthened – the banner left by Chief Justice Rehnquist concerning 
the enforcement of the separation of powers. 
B.  Florida’s Non-Delegation Test 
Florida strongly enforces the non-delegation doctrine, and in doing so, it 
has developed a test that makes the same central inquiry as the Marshall test – 
namely, whether the legislature has made the important or fundamental policy 
decision.  But Florida courts have fleshed out the Marshall test more than fed-
eral courts ever did, thereby providing an illuminating model for how federal 
courts could consistently enforce the doctrine and alleviate line-drawing con-
cerns. 
1.  Askew 
In Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated 
a statutory provision allowing an executive agency to designate an area as a 
“critical state concern.”135  The statute empowered the Division of State Plan-
ning to “recommend areas of critical state concern to the Governor and cabinet 
acting as the Administration Commission.”136  The Division of State Planning 
utilized the following criteria to determine whether to recommend designation 
of a particular area as one of critical state concern: 
(a) An area containing, or having a significant impact upon, environ-
mental, historical, natural, or archaeological resources of regional or 
statewide importance. 
(b) An area significantly affected by, or having a significant effect upon, 
an existing or proposed major public facility or other area of major pub-
lic investment. 
(c) A proposed area of major development potential, which may include 
a proposed site of a new community, designated in a state land devel-
opment plan.137 
No other criteria could be employed by the Division.138  Importantly, the Ad-
ministration Commission could not designate more than 5% of the land within 
the state as an area of critical state concern.139  Within forty-five days of re-
ceiving the recommendations from the Division, the Administration Commis-
 
 135. 372 So. 2d 913, 914, 924 (Fla. 1978). 
 136. Id. at 914. 
 137. Id. at 914–15 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 380.05(2) (1975)). 
 138. Id. at 914. 
 139. Id. at 915. 
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sion needed to reject, adopt wholesale, or adopt and modify the recommenda-
tions.140  After designating an area of critical state concern, the Administration 
Commission then would need to “approve[] the principles for guiding devel-
opment of the designated area.”141  For areas designated of critical state con-
cern, virtually all development is regulated, including changes to buildings, 
land use, water use, air use, shores, drilling, and waste deposits.142  At issue in 
the case were designations in the Green Swamp and Florida Keys.143 
The Florida Supreme Court began its analysis by quoting from article II, 
section 3 of the Florida Constitution, which reads: “The powers of the state 
government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches.  
No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to 
either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein.”144  The court 
then acknowledged “the modern trend in administrative law . . . to relax the 
doctrine of unlawful delegation of legislative power in favor of an analysis 
which focuses upon the existence of procedural safeguards in the administra-
tive process.”145 
The court, however, rejected the modern trend and then described why 
broad delegations are problematic.  Legislation that “is so lacking in guide-
lines” fails to permit courts to “determine whether the agency is carrying out 
the intent of the legislature,” resulting in the agency becoming “the lawgiver 
rather than the administrator of the law.”146  The delegations at issue in the case 
were “constitutionally defective because they reposit in the Administration 
Commission the fundamental legislative task of determining which geographic 
areas and resources are in greatest need of protection.”147  Reviewing courts 
cannot ascertain whether the Administration Commission’s priorities were in 
line with the intent of the legislature where delegations are so broad and 
vague.148 
The lower court, which was tasked with deciphering whether the Admin-
istration Commission acted within its delegated authority, stated that the Act 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 916. 
 143. Id. at 916–17. 
 144. Id. at 918 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. 2, § 3).  Though Florida has an express 
separation of powers provision in its state constitution, that fact is immaterial in com-
paring delegation enforcement to other states because most state constitutions also have 
express separation of powers provisions, and yet those states take varied approaches to 
enforcing the non-delegation doctrine.  See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lin-
gering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. 
REV. 1167, 1187–1201 (1999).  It is also immaterial that the Federal Constitution lacks 
an express separation of powers provision because the separation of powers doctrine 
has been implied from the Vesting Clauses of the first three articles.  See id. at 1177. 
 145. Askew, 372 So. 2d at 918. 
 146. Id. at 918–19. 
 147. Id. at 919. 
 148. Id. 
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“does not establish or provide for establishing priorities or other means for 
identifying and choosing among the resources the Act is intended to pre-
serve.”149  At root, the problem for the lower court was that “[t]he Act treats 
alike, as fungible goods, disparate categories of environmental, historical, nat-
ural and archaeological resources of regional or statewide importance and all 
of Florida’s manifold resources within those vast categories.”150  The Florida 
Supreme Court, agreeing with what the lower court identified as the chief de-
ficiency in the Act, noted that “the absence of legislative delineation of priori-
ties among competing areas and resources which require protection in the State 
interest [renders the Act unconstitutional].”151  In short, weighing and balanc-
ing incommensurable competing interests is the fundamental task of legisla-
tors, not those charged with executing the law. 
The appellants in Askew argued that the delegation was permissible be-
cause the court had previously upheld a broader delegation, one where the cab-
inet could promulgate rules to curb “unfair . . . acts or practices in the conduct 
of any trade or commerce.”152  That case, however, merely involved “flesh[ing] 
out” legislative policy by executive administrators.153  In Askew, by contrast, 
the executive administrators were not fleshing out “an articulated legislative 
policy” but rather were “making the initial determination of what policy should 
be.”154  As alternatively phrased by the court, “[T]he Administration Commis-
sion ‘fleshes out’ what it has in the first instance conceived.”155  The Admin-
istration Commission was tasked with creating policy ex nihilo through its “ex-
ercise of primary and independent discretion rather than the determination 
‘within defined limits, and subject to review, (of) some fact upon which the 
law by its own terms operates.’”156 
Throughout the rest of the opinion, the court, channeling Chief Justice 
Marshall, reiterated several times that “fundamental and primary policy deci-
sions” must be made by the legislature157 and delegations for purposes of “ex-
pendien[cy]” are unconstitutional.158  Administrators are confined to fleshing 
out policy because they have certain kinds of technical expertise – they are not 
are mini-legislators.  Weighing and balancing incommensurable competing in-
terests, however, does not involve technical expertise.  Such questions do not 
have a technically correct answer.  Because there is no technically correct an-
swer for those types of questions, citizens elect legislators to prudently choose 
 
 149. Id. (quoting Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062, 1069 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1977)). 
 150. Id. (quoting Cross Key Waterways, 352 So. 2d at 1069). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 920 (alteration in original) (quoting Dep’t of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 
329 So. 2d 257, 262 (Fla. 1976)). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. (quoting State v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 47 So. 969, 972 (Fla. 1908)). 
 157. Id. at 925. 
 158. Id. at 924. 
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among competing values.  Requiring that legislators make fundamental and 
primary policy decisions ensures that “Florida’s government will continue to 
operate only by consent of the governed.”159 
The court explained the test’s contours more comprehensively than Chief 
Justice Marshall did, but the test applied in Askew is a carbon copy of that 
enunciated in Wayman.  Most revealing is Marshall’s admonition that only the 
details can be for the administrators to fill in.160  Marshall is basically saying 
what the Florida Supreme Court said, namely that the legislature must make 
fundamental and primary policy decisions.  While line drawing is difficult, if 
the law can be said to operate on some fact by its own terms, then the law likely 
passes muster. 
The law at issue in Askew is similar to the law at issue in Marshall Field 
but with crucial differences that cause it to fail the Marshall test.  First, the 
Administration Commission has guidelines, but it is not merely determining 
when the guidelines are met and then applying the law.161  Because there was 
a 5% cap on total lands that could be designated as of critical state concern, the 
Administration Commission needed to weigh competing incommensurable in-
terests.162  In Marshall Field, by contrast, the executive merely had to deter-
mine whether trade duties and exactions were unequal and unreasonable in or-
der for the law to take effect.163  There was no cap on trade duties, and thus, 
the President did not have pick and choose which duties and exactions he would 
focus on.164  Marshall Field, therefore, concerned true contingent legislation, 
while Askew required characteristically legislative interest balancing and pri-
oritizing. 
Second, the law in Marshall Field took effect once the executive deter-
mined certain conditions were met, while in Askew, the Administration Com-
mission would first designate an area as critical state concern and then approve 
the principles to guide development of the area.165  In this respect, the law was 
more like the law in J.W. Hampton because there the executive could adjust 
the tariff rates rather than just determine when a triggering event occurred.166  
Even so, the law in Askew is a significantly broader delegation than that in J.W. 
Hampton because, in the latter, the President was reined in by the command to 
equalize the costs of production.167  The Askew law, however, provided a laun-
dry list of different variables that the Administration Commission could con-
sider.168  As such, the operation of the law in Askew was uncertain and almost 
wholly within the discretion of the Administration Commission. 
 
 159. Id. at 925 (England, C.J., concurring). 
 160. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825). 
 161. See Askew, 372 So. 2d at 918–19. 
 162. See id. at 915, 919. 
 163. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 681 (1892). 
 164. See id. 
 165. Compare id. at 681, 693, with Askew, 372 So. 2d at 920. 
 166. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 401 (1928). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Askew, 372 So. 2d at 914–15. 
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The J.W. Hampton law, by contrast, contained a difficult-to-calculate, but 
nevertheless defined, limitation on the President.  Experts can argue over how 
to calculate the costs of production, but regardless of which method is chosen, 
an answer always exists once that method is selected.  Legislatures can, but 
understandably do not always, decide what method of calculation to use in 
achieving a legislative goal.  Determining whether an area contains or has a 
significant impact upon regional or statewide environmental, historical, natu-
ral, or archaeological resources, however, leaves so much discretion to the ex-
ecutive that the discretion is no longer a difference in degree but a difference 
in kind.  That level of discretion means the executive is making a fundamental 
and primary policy choice that the legislature has relinquished. 
2.  Schiavo 
In 1990, Terri Schiavo suffered a cardiac arrest and never regained con-
sciousness.169  Shortly after her nutrition and hydration tubes were each re-
moved in October 2003, the Florida Legislature passed Terri’s Law, and the 
governor signed it into law.170  The relevant part read: 
Section 1. (1) The Governor shall have the authority to issue a one-time 
stay to prevent the withholding of nutrition and hydration from a patient 
if, as of October 15, 2003: 
(a) That patient has no written advance directive; 
(b) The court has found that patient to be in a persistent vegetative state; 
(c) That patient has had nutrition and hydration withheld; and 
(d) A member of that patient’s family has challenged the withholding 
of nutrition and hydration.171 
Michael Schiavo, Terri’s husband and guardian, sought a declaratory judgment 
holding that the so-called Terri’s Law was unconstitutional.172  The Florida 
Supreme Court once again began its analysis by quoting article II, section 3 of 
the Florida Constitution.173  First, the court analyzed whether the law imper-
missibly encroached upon the judiciary.174  Subsequently, the court found the 
statute to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the gover-
nor.175 
 
 169. Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. 2004). 
 170. Id. at 328. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 329. 
 174. Id. at 329–32. 
 175. Id. at 332. 
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Quoting Askew, the court reiterated that the legislature must make “fun-
damental and primary policy decisions.”176  Like in Askew, the court again em-
phasized the need to provide the Executive Branch with guidelines to curb “un-
bridled discretion” and permit “meaningful judicial review.”177  The Florida 
Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that the law “contain[ed] no guide-
lines or standards that would serve to limit the Governor from exercising com-
pletely unrestricted discretion in applying the law.”178  The court then cited and 
agreed with the lower court’s conclusion that “[t]he Act confers upon the Gov-
ernor the unfettered discretion to determine what the terms of the Act mean and 
when, or if, he may act under it.”179  Because the statute provided 
no criteria to guide the Governor’s decision about whether to act[,] [and 
because] . . . there are no criteria for the Governor to evaluate in decid-
ing whether to lift the stay[,] . . . [the Act] allows the Governor to act 
“through whim, show [ ] favoritism, or exercis[e] unbridled discre-
tion.”180 
Here, therefore, the Schiavo court largely followed the Marshall test 
framework that Askew utilized.  The primary concern in Askew was also the 
main worry for the Schiavo court, namely the limitless discretion that the stat-
ute gave the governor, which essentially amounted to policy-making author-
ity.181  Also alluded to in Askew, the Schiavo court emphasized the need for 
judicial review, which is impossible where a statute delegates such broad au-
thority to the executive that any decision the executive makes will be lawful; 
or, in short, if there can be no as-applied challenges because the breadth and 
fluidity of authority delegated, then the only remedy is to invalidate the statute 
on its face.182 
3.  Imhotep-Nguzo 
In Imhotep-Nguzo Saba Charter School v. Department of Education, a 
Florida intermediate appellate court upheld a statute challenged under the non-
delegation doctrine.183  The statute at issue related to establishing charter 
schools.  It contained a section that articulated three guiding principles: 
 
 176. Id. (quoting Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 925 (Fla. 1978)). 
 177. Id. (quoting Lewis v. Bank of Pasco Cty., 346 So. 2d 53, 55–56 (Fla. 1976) 
(per curiam)). 
 178. Id. at 334 (internal quotations omitted). 
 179. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 180. Id. at 336 (seventh and eighth alterations in original) (quoting Lewis, 346 So. 
2d at 56). 
 181. Compare id., with Askew, 372 So. 2d at 920. 
 182. Compare Schiavo, 885 So. 2d at 332, with Askew, 372 So. 2d at 918–19. 
 183. 947 So. 2d 1279, 1284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam). 
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1. Meet high standards of student achievement while providing parents 
flexibility to choose among diverse educational opportunities within the 
state’s public school system. 
2. Promote enhanced academic success and financial efficiency by 
aligning responsibility with accountability. 
3. Provide parents with sufficient information on whether their child is 
reading at grade level and whether the child gains at least a year’s worth 
of learning for every year spent in the charter school.184 
It also had five required purposes charter schools had to fulfill: 
1. Improve student learning and academic achievement. 
2. Increase learning opportunities for all students, with special em-
phasis on low-performing students and reading. 
3. Create new professional opportunities for teachers, including owner-
ship of the learning program at the school site. 
4. Encourage the use of innovative learning methods. 
5. Require the measurement of learning outcomes.185 
Finally, there were four recommended purposes in the statute: 
1. Create innovative measurement tools. 
2. Provide rigorous competition within the public school district to 
stimulate continual improvement in all public schools. 
3. Expand the capacity of the public school system. 
4. Mitigate the educational impact created by the development of new 
residential dwelling units.186 
In addition to the guiding principles and purposes, there were also five lengthy 
requirements for charter school applications.187  Two charter schools appealed 
 
 184. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 1002.33(2)(a) (2005)). 
 185. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 1002.33(2)(b)). 
 186. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 1002.33(2)(c)). 
 187. Id. at 1283.  The five requirements stated: 
 
1. Demonstrates how the school will use the guiding principles and meet the 
statutorily defined purpose of a charter school. 2. Provides a detailed curriculum 
plan that illustrates how students will be provided services to attain the Sunshine 
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decisions by the State Board of Education and county school board “to deny 
charters to the two proposed schools.”188  The statute was challenged for 
providing insufficient guidance to local school boards regarding which charter 
school applications should be denied and which granted.189  In short, the dele-
gation challenge alleged that the state legislature impermissibly delegated leg-
islative power to local school boards, although “it is the legislature’s job to say 
what the law is, not that of a local school board.”190 
Like in Schiavo, the court here emphasized the discretion, or lack thereof, 
the statute affords the delagatee.191  For example, the court noted that “[t]he 
‘crucial test’ is whether the statute ‘contains sufficient standards or guidelines 
to enable the agency and the courts to determine whether the agency is carrying 
out the legislature’s intent.’”192  Insufficient guidance effectively renders the 
statute an “attempt[] to grant to the administrative body the power to say what 
the law shall be.”193 
The court held that “the ‘Guiding Principles; Purpose’ section of the stat-
ute, when coupled with the mandatory application requirements, save the leg-
islative delegation from separation of powers problems.”194  Because the court 
relied on both the Guiding Principles section and the mandatory application 
requirements, the implication is that, without either, the statute would have 
been an impermissible delegation.  When combined, though, the court was able 
to understand the “entire statutory scheme” and decipher the primary legisla-
tive policy, which was “legislative concern with the quality of the academic 
and financial performance of charter schools and the ability of the applicant to 
 
State Standards. 3. Contains goals and objectives for improving student learning 
and measuring that improvement.  These goals and objectives must indicate 
how much academic improvement students are expected to show each year, 
how success will be evaluated, and the specific results to be attained through 
instruction. 4. Describes the reading curriculum and differentiated strategies 
that will be used for students reading at grade level or higher and a separate 
curriculum and strategies for students who are reading below grade level.  A 
sponsor shall deny a charter if the school does not propose a reading curriculum 
that is consistent with effective teaching strategies that are grounded in scien-
tifically based reading research. 5. Contains an annual financial plan for each 
year requested by the charter for operation of the school for up to 5 years.  This 
plan must contain anticipated fund balances based on revenue projections, a 
spending plan based on projected revenues and expenses, and a description of 
controls that will safeguard finances and projected enrollment trends. 
 
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 1002.33(6)(a)). 
 188. Id. at 1280. 
 189. Id. at 1282. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 1282–83 (quoting Dep’t of Ins. v. Se. Volusia Hosp. Dist., 438 So. 2d 
815, 819 (Fla. 1983)). 
 193. Id. at 1283 (quoting Sarasota Cty. v. Barg, 302 So. 2d 737, 742 (Fla. 1974)). 
 194. Id. at 1284. 
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meet the high standards set by the statute.”195  The statute thus passed the “cru-
cial test” cited earlier because there was a discernible legislative policy that 
could be derived from the standards and guidelines contained in the law.196  
The final step in the court’s analysis was to determine if the school board’s 
policy for assessing charter school applications adhered to the standards and 
guidelines of the statute, which it did.197  The law was upheld because, in brief, 
the statute, by its own terms, enunciated a discernible policy, and the only tasks 
then left for the school board were genuine gap filling.198 
C.  Other States 
Florida is not alone in embracing the Marshall test.  Several other states 
do so with varying degrees of commitment and success.199  California, for in-
stance, has adopted the Marshall test but has interpreted its limits so broadly 
that it provides no real check on the distribution of power.200 
The Supreme Court of California describes the non-delegation test as fol-
lows: “The Legislature must make the fundamental policy determinations, but 
after declaring the legislative goals and establishing a yardstick guiding the 
administrator, it may authorize the administrator to adopt rules and regulations 
to promote the purposes of the legislation and to carry it into effect.”201  In 
1976, the Determinate Sentencing Act (“DSA”) was enacted.202  The DSA cre-
ated a sentencing system where there were three possible sentences for each 
offense.203  Moreover, the DSA required courts to impose the middle of the 
three sentencing terms “unless there are circumstances in aggravation or miti-
gation of the crime.”204  The legislature directed an administrative body to 
adopt rules that would provide criteria to trial judges for imposing the upper or 
lower prison term.205  The delegation stated that the administrative body was 
to adopt rules “to promote uniformity in sentencing.”206 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 1282–83, 1284. 
 197. Id. at 1284. 
 198. See id.  The case also demonstrates that the legislature has taken cues from the 
courts about how to draft statutes, as the statute here included a section titled “Guiding 
Principles.”  See id. 
 199. See, e.g., C & S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. City of Westfield, 766 N.E.2d 63, 
67 (Mass. 2002); In re Initiative Petition No. 366, 46 P.3d 123, 129 (Okla. 2002); In re 
Blizzard, 42 A.3d 791, 795 (N.H. 2012). 
 200. See People v. Wright, 639 P.2d 267, 271 (Cal. 1982). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 268. 
 203. Id. at 268–69. 
 204. Id. at 269 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.3(b) (West 2017)). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 269 n.1 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.3(a)). 
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That delegation was challenged in Wright, where the Supreme Court of 
California upheld the DSA as constitutionally valid.207  First, the court deter-
mined that the legislature made the fundamental policy choice to change from 
very discretionary sentencing to a system with three fixed sentencing terms for 
each offense.208  Next, recognizing that the constraint of promoting uniformity 
was rather weak, the court stated, “While promotion of ‘uniformity’ in some 
circumstances may not provide a sufficient standard, the Legislature estab-
lished the standard in [a] correlative provision . . . that the criteria be based on 
the absence or presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances.”209  Thus, 
like in Imhotep-Nguzo, the Wright court looked to other standards in the statute 
to see if the delegation was narrowed.  The problem, though, is that unlike 
Imhotep-Nguzo, the delegation in Wright was not really narrowed by any other 
parts of the statute.  The aggravating or mitigating circumstances language 
simply referred to what the administrative body was charged with adopting 
uniform rules for.  In other words, the delegation was to adopt uniform rules 
for when a judge should impose the higher or lower prison term (rather than 
the middle term).  Therefore, the only constraint in the delegation was that the 
rules be uniform. 
What seemed to save the delegation was that the administrative body in-
cluded judges with “extensive experience in determining sentences,” and thus 
the body was “uniquely situated to implement the legislative policy.”210  The 
court went even further, noting that “it would be questionable, if not unwise, 
to reject the experience and qualifications of the agency and insist that the Leg-
islature impose the detailed criteria when it chose to adopt the new method of 
sentencing.”211  Who was being delegated power (i.e., those who had expertise 
in sentencing) thus seemed to trump the lack of standards in the delegation.  
That is a flawed application of the Marshall test because simply changing to a 
more determinate method of sentencing is not a fundamental policy choice, at 
least not a complete one.  A complete policy choice would give some direction 
to the administrative body about what the criteria for imposing a higher or 
lower sentence should be.  For example, the legislature could have said that the 
administrative body is to adopt uniform rules that mitigate a sentence if some-
one is from an economically disadvantaged background.  The administrative 
body would then be tasked with determining what constitutes an economically 
disadvantaged background.  As summed up by the dissent, “[T]he Legislature 
failed to make the general policy decisions necessary to determine what factors 
justify a variance from the middle term.”212 
 
 207. Id. at 271. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 273 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). 
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As a rebuttal, one might argue that any reasonable judge (i.e., those mak-
ing up the administrative body) would take a defendant’s economically disad-
vantaged background into account when adopting rules.  But that is beside the 
point.  The non-delegation doctrine is a doctrine focused on formalities.  The 
Wright court’s non-delegation analysis was flawed because it focused on who 
would be making the sentencing rules.  Having experts inform rules within 
their field of expertise is undoubtedly a good thing, but it is irrelevant to the 
non-delegation inquiry because that is a substantive – not a formal – aspect of 
the law.  As discussed below, the non-delegation doctrine is not too rigidly 
formalistic, but the Wright court threw all formality out the window and fudged 
the fundamental policy inquiry based on what the court thought was a substan-
tively reasonable judgment about who should make sentencing rules.  The fo-
cus on who was carrying out the delegation is especially pernicious because 
the bedrock concern underlying the non-delegation doctrine is adherence to the 
rule of law, and the rule of law is inherently undermined when more latitude is 
given depending on who is in front of the court. 
The key takeaway from the brief discussion of California’s non-delega-
tion jurisprudence is that the Marshall test is not perfect.  Like all legal stand-
ards, it requires a judge to exercise good judgment in applying it.  Although the 
test is flawed, the response to this fact is not to look for another test that can 
mindlessly be applied perfectly – no such test exists.  The better response is to 
build up clear, well-reasoned non-delegation jurisprudence using the Marshall 
test, like Florida has attempted to do.  Florida’s test and its application of its 
test are lacking in some ways, but, for those who are concerned about enforcing 
the dictates of the Constitution, it is a step in the right direction. 
III.  COMPLEX AND TECHNICAL ISSUES IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 
The second reason that the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to enforce 
the non-delegation doctrine over the last eight decades is that the Court thinks 
enforcement would be too rigid.  The following statement from the majority in 
Mistretta briefly encapsulates this argument: “Applying [the] ‘intelligible prin-
ciple’ test to congressional delegations, our [non-delegation] jurisprudence has 
been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex so-
ciety, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress 
simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general 
directives.”213  The Mistretta majority relied on Opp Cotton Mills in arguing 
that Congress lacks the technical expertise needed for more precise statutes, 
but that reliance shows this argument is flawed even at its roots.214  In Opp 
Cotton Mills, the Court stated that “[i]n an increasingly complex society Con-
gress obviously could not perform its functions if it were obliged to find all the 
 
 213. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
 214. See id. 
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facts subsidiary to the basic conclusions which support the defined legislative 
policy.”215 
While it is readily conceded that members of Congress are mostly gener-
alists and those in administrative agencies are specialists, it does not follow 
that Congress can merely delegate to the agency to act in the public interest.  
Furthermore, the Marshall and Askew tests firmly support the statements above 
from Opp Cotton Mills.  Those tests specifically contemplate that “facts sub-
sidiary to the basic . . . defined legislative policy” can be found by executive 
agencies, and thus the Court seems to be arguing against a straw man.216  Those 
tests only require that Congress does indeed enact a defined legislative policy, 
whereupon it is possible for administrative agencies to then merely execute the 
policy and find the relevant facts.  The Marshall and Askew tests effectively 
say the same thing as the Supreme Court did in Opp Cotton Mills. 
The problem, however, is that the Mistretta majority recasts and broadens 
the statement in Opp Cotton Mills.  While the Opp Cotton Mills Court specified 
that Congress must have a “defined legislative policy,” the Mistretta majority 
states that “broad general directives” are sufficient.217  Broad general direc-
tives, however, undermine the mere subsidiary fact-finding and application of 
defined policies that the Opp Cotton Mills Court stressed.  The Mistretta ma-
jority further reveals its misreading of past precedents by relying upon218 the 
statement in American Power & Light that the Court has deemed it “constitu-
tionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public 
agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.”219 
Delegations such as those to regulate “in the public interest” do not delin-
eate general policy – or any policy at all – nor do they set boundaries to dele-
gated authority.  The delegation in Mistretta was more defined than the Na-
tional Broadcasting public interest delegation, but the Court nevertheless errs 
in recasting the test for delegation as basically non-existent in light of the fact 
that society has become more complex.  The underlying error the Court com-
mits is assuming that the non-delegation is wholly inflexible, such that it would 
either break if bent or that modern government would collapse if it does not 
bend.  States like Florida that strongly enforce the non-delegation doctrine have 
not, however, regressed into feudal societies.  Rather, Florida jurisprudence 
demonstrates that the non-delegation doctrine can indeed bend without break-
ing by employing a sliding scale that adjusts the threshold for the test based 
upon the technical difficulty of the problem being confronted. 
 
 215. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm’r of Wage & Hour Div. of Dep’t of Labor, 312 
U.S. 126, 145 (1941). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Compare id., with Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372. 
 218. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372–73. 
 219. Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946). 
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A.  Avatar 
In Avatar Development Corp. v. State, a corporation challenged the con-
stitutionality of a statute penalizing the willful violation of permit conditions 
issued by the Department of Environmental Protection for the purpose of pre-
venting or controlling pollution.220  The corporation was alleged to have will-
fully violated special conditions while conducting dredge and fill operations in 
some man-made canals that were tributaries to an intracoastal waterway.221  
The relevant section of the challenged statute stated: 
It is declared to be the public policy of this state to conserve the waters 
of the state and to protect, maintain, and improve the quality thereof for 
public water supplies, for the propagation of wildlife and fish and other 
aquatic life, and for domestic, agricultural, industrial, recreational, and 
other beneficial uses and to provide that no wastes be discharged into 
any waters of the state without first being given the degree of treatment 
necessary to protect the beneficial uses of such water.222 
After discussing major non-delegation cases like Askew and addressing dele-
gations in the criminal context, the Florida Supreme Court noted that “the suf-
ficiency of adequate standards depends on the complexity of the subject matter 
and the ‘degree of difficulty involved in articulating finite standards.’”223 
The court then heavily stressed the “highly technical, scientific regulatory 
schemes” needed to ensure proper protection of the environment and fulfill the 
dictates of legislative policy.224  Emphasizing that it would be “difficult, if not 
impossible, to require the Legislature to enact such rules, regulations and pro-
cedures [to protect the environment,]” the court stated that the legislature 
should be allowed to defer to a “specialized administrative body” to fill in gaps 
after it has already made the fundamental and primary policy decisions.225  The 
court ended its analysis by again highlighting that the Department of Environ-
mental Protection “employs persons equipped with the knowledge and exper-
tise necessary to handle such highly technical and intricate matters in the end-
less variety of real-life situations that are presented to the agency.”226  Accord-
ingly, the statute “strike[s] a practical and proper balance” between the legis-
lature making a fundamental policy decision and deferring to the Department 
of Environmental Protection to wield its expertise.227 
 
 220. 723 So. 2d 199, 200 (Fla. 1998). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 206 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 403.021(2) (1997)). 
 223. Id. at 207 (quoting Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 918 (Fla. 
1978)). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
30
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss2/8
2017] RESUSCITATING THE NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE 471 
The roughly 250-word section of the statute declaring the legislative pol-
icy clearly meets the Askew test.  The legislative command to “improve . . . the 
propagation of wildlife and fish and other aquatic life” is rather broad but is 
nevertheless a clearly delineated policy.228  The law, for example, may inde-
pendently operate on an individual whose practices inhibit the propagation of 
aquatic life.  If an individual was not inhibiting aquatic life (or in contravention 
of any of the other articulated policies), a regulation promulgated under the 
statute that targeted that person would be invalid, which demonstrates that the 
delegation is not so broad or vague as to leave unbridled discretion to the De-
partment of Environmental Protection or prevent meaningful judicial review.  
While the statute gives wide discretion to the Department, that discretion is 
necessary in light of the highly technical expertise needed to adequately main-
tain air and water quality and to sustain such quality over a period of time. 
The case is distinguishable from Askew because the statute in Askew 
merely directed the agency to designate an area of critical concern if it had a 
significant impact upon or affected a wide range of different interests.  It is 
hard to imagine any area in a populous state that does not have some resource 
(historical, natural, archeological, etc.) of regional concern or the potential to 
be developed.  Improving aquatic life or preventing injury to animal life, on 
the other hand, are broad but defined goals.  Furthermore, the overall goal is to 
improve air and water quality, which can be coherently pursued all at once.  
Designating a finite number of areas as of critical state concern based on factors 
ranging from historical resources to economic potential is precisely the type of 
weighing and balancing of broad goals that the legislature is tasked with doing.  
In short, the statute in Avatar had one interest that the Department must pursue; 
the statute in Askew, by contrast, had myriad types of interests that often con-
flict and must be weighed against each other.  Therefore, the primary work of 
the Department in Avatar was to utilize its expertise to find facts about what 
types of activities will further the state’s interest in improving air and water 
quality.  The agency in Askew, on the other hand, had to make a number of 
policy decisions, some as basic as what type of impact it is concerned with – a 
positive or negative impact.  That would be like if the statute left it to the dis-
cretion of the Department to determine if air and water quality should be de-
graded or improved, which is clearly a fundamental policy decision. 
The sliding scale test’s threshold for constitutionality was lowered in Av-
atar because of the technical nature of the issue.  The statute at issue in Askew 
was not afforded that lower threshold because there is no such thing as exper-
tise in weighing competing general interests in things like historical value ver-
sus environmental value.  Those are quintessential legislative policy judgments 
and thus must be decided by the legislature.  It likely does take a PhD in marine 
biology, however, to determine what level of mercury would degrade the 
aquatic habitat of the blue marlin.  Because no one expects generalist legisla-
tors to immerse themselves so deeply in the nitty-gritty of environmental reg-
ulations, the court rightly determined that the legislature made the fundamental 
 
 228. See id. at 206–07 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 403.021(2) (1997)). 
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policy choice and could delegate the remaining details to administrative ex-
perts. 
B.  Southern Alliance 
The Florida Supreme Court upheld a delegation and again stressed the 
flexibility of the doctrine when Southern Alliance for Clean Energy challenged 
a statute for unconstitutionally delegating legislative authority to the Florida 
Public Service Commission.229  Partially quoting the statute, the court found 
that the legislature “made the fundamental and primary policy decision to ‘pro-
mote utility investment in nuclear or integrated gasification combined cycle 
power plants and allow for the recovery in rates of all prudently incurred 
costs.’”230  The statute directed the Public Service Commission to establish al-
ternative cost recovery mechanisms and stated the mechanisms were “for the 
recovery of costs incurred in the siting, design, licensing, and construction of 
a nuclear power plant, including new, expanded, or relocated electrical trans-
mission lines and facilities that are necessary thereto, or of an integrated gasi-
fication combined cycle power plant.”231  Furthermore, the statute stipulated 
that the mechanisms 
shall include, but not be limited to . . . [r]ecovery through the capacity 
cost recovery clause of any preconstruction costs . . . [and] through an 
incremental increase in the utility’s capacity cost recovery clause rates 
of the carrying costs on the utility’s projected construction cost balance 
associated with the nuclear or integrated gasification combined cycle 
power plant.232 
Southern Alliance for Clean Energy argued that the term “prudently in-
curred costs” was not an objective standard or one that provided any meaning-
ful guidance to the Public Service Commission.233  In response, the court as-
serted that “statutes and caselaw routinely apply the prudence standard in the 
PSC context” and provided several statutes and cases as support.234  The court 
then noted that the “standard for determining prudence is well documented in 
our past Orders” and proceeded to explain the standard.235 
After discussing the limitations on agency discretion in the statute, the 
court asserted that “[t]he specificity with which the legislature must set out 
statutory standards and guidelines may depend upon the subject matter dealt 
 
 229. S. All. for Clean Energy v. Graham, 113 So. 3d 742, 745 (Fla. 2013) (per cu-
riam). 
 230. Id. at 748 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 366.93(2) (2010)). 
 231. Id. at 748–49 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 366.93(2)). 
 232. Id. at 749 (alterations in original) (quoting FLA. STAT. §§ 366.93(2)(a)–(b)). 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 749–50. 
 235. Id. at 750 (internal quotations omitted). 
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with and the degree of difficulty involved in articulating finite standards.”236  
Because of the “arcane complexities of utility rate-making,” the legislature had 
more leeway to craft a broad delegation.237  Establishing alternative cost recov-
ery mechanisms was not a fundamental legislative task because “subordinate 
functions like those at issue here ‘may be transferred by the legislature to per-
mit administration of legislative policy by an agency with the expertise and 
flexibility needed to deal with complex and fluid conditions.’”238  Because “the 
legislative policy-making function has [not] been usurped by or improperly 
transferred to the PSC,” the delegation was held to be constitutional.239  There-
fore, the delegation was upheld on a two-pronged basis: (1) the “prudently in-
curred cost” phrase was vague on its face but not in reality, where case law had 
built up a concrete definition of the term240 and (2) the complex and technical 
nature of the subject matter necessitated slightly easing the strictures of the 
non-delegation doctrine.241 
As cases like Avatar and Southern Alliance show, Florida’s non-delega-
tion jurisprudence is sensitive to “our increasingly complex society, replete 
with ever changing and more technical problems.”242  The Florida Supreme 
Court has often upheld cases challenging delegations specifically on that basis, 
as the two cases above demonstrate.  However, it should also be noted that the 
two cases above gave only a bit more leeway to the legislature – they did not 
hold that classifying a statute as addressing complex and technical problems 
means the delegation is subject to no scrutiny at all.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
in Mistretta therefore overstated the concerns with enforcing the non-delega-
tion doctrine.  The parade of horribles that the Court envisioned turned out to 
be a fiction.  Furthermore, the broad general directives, at least as the Court 
apparently conceived them, were so broad as to effectively allow agencies to 
usurp the policymaking function of the legislature.  The directives in Avatar 
and Southern Alliance were broad but still provided enough precision that a 
court could identify when an agency was acting within the bounds of its dele-
gated authority.  The Mistretta Court thus misinterpreted the non-delegation 
doctrine as demanding too much from Congress and solved the problem by 
demanding nothing at all.  That solution is no longer justified because states 
such as Florida have demonstrated that there is a way to enforce the non-dele-
gation doctrine without stifling effective legislation and administration. 
 
 236. Id. (quoting In re Advisory Op. to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292, 311 (1987)). 
 237. Id. (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Albert Litter Studios, Inc., 896 So. 2d 
891, 896 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)). 
 238. Id. (quoting Microtel, Inc. v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 464 So. 2d 1189, 1191 
(Fla. 1985)). 
 239. Id. at 751 (quoting AT & T Commc’ns of the S. States v. Marks, 515 So. 2d 
741, 743 (Fla. 1987)). 
 240. Id. at 749–50. 
 241. Id. at 750. 
 242. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
33
Kritkos: Resuscitating the Non-Delegation Doctrine
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
474 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
C.  Not a Death Knell 
One of the background assumptions of the argument that society is too 
complex to enforce the non-delegation doctrine could be that invalidating a 
statute on delegation grounds is effectively a death knell for the statute.243  
Though limited, there is evidence that this is not so.  In a study of a thirty-year 
period where the Illinois Supreme Court vigorously enforced the non-delega-
tion doctrine, only one statute of the roughly fifteen that were invalidated was 
not subsequently enacted, and it was largely unnecessary to rewrite and enact 
again because it was duplicative of another statute.244  In the thirteen other in-
stances (one other statute was wholly repealed), the legislature narrowed the 
discretion in the statute and passed it again.245  While it is difficult for Congress 
to enact legislation, there is no reason to think it is harder to do than at the state 
level.  It may happen that there is a new Congress by the time that a statute is 
invalidated, but the same situation could have happened in Illinois.  Illinois 
state representatives have a two-year election cycle,246 like Congress, yet the 
Illinois General Assembly still managed to pass thirteen statutes that had been 
wholly or partially invalidated.  Alternatively, the possibility that an invali-
dated statute will not be passed again is not thought to weigh against its uncon-
stitutionality in any other sphere of constitutional law, so there should not be a 
special rule just for non-delegation challenges. 
D.  Agency Efficiency 
The primary assumption underlying the complex and changing society 
argument is that broad delegations aid agencies by giving them flexibility to 
solve problems.  But there is also some evidence that indicates that broad del-
egations actually inhibit agencies from efficiently and effectively regulating.  
A 1993 report by the Minnesota Commission on Reform and Efficiency deter-
mined that the biggest cause of delay in rulemaking was broad or vague statutes 
that amounted to delegating policymaking authority to agencies.247  To solve 
the problem, the Commission proposed that the legislature resolve basic policy 
 
 243. There is general support for this theory, as “certain features of the national 
lawmaking process, such as bicameralism and the Senate filibuster, hinder efforts to 
enact legislation at the federal level even when the national majority favors the same 
policy.”  Robert A. Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1669, 1684 (2007). 
 244. George Bunn, Kathleen Irwin & F. Kyra Sido, No Regulation Without Repre-
sentation: Would Judicial Enforcement of a Stricter Nondelegation Doctrine Limit Ad-
ministrative Lawmaking?, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 341, 366, 368. 
 245. Id. at 366. 
 246. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 2(b). 
 247. THE MINN. COMM’N ON REFORM & EFFICIENCY, REFORMING MINNESOTA’S 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING SYSTEM 19, 21 (Mar. 1993), http://ar-
chive.leg.state.mn.us/docs/pre2003/mandated/930381/detailed.pdf. 
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issues before delegating authority to agencies.248  Rules made by agencies pur-
suant to vague statutes are worse than laws made by the legislature for the same 
reason that such rules are often delayed: making policy is not within agencies’ 
expertise. 
The Commission’s findings and recommendations comport with the 
foundational premises of the administrative state.  For instance, a premise of 
effective administration is that experts should utilize their expertise in the areas 
where it is relevant.  It is within the expertise of a chemist to determine how 
many parts per million of chlorine there are in a given stream.  It is not within 
a chemist’s expertise to ban in-ground pools due to chlorine seepage, because 
that judgment requires assessing and balancing considerations like the eco-
nomic and social interests against health interests.  Legislators – not adminis-
trative agencies – are experts in assessing the popular will and balancing com-
peting interests to advance the welfare of the whole.  As the Askew non-dele-
gation test recognizes, that assessment and balancing are the two constitutive 
elements of policymaking and thus appropriately reside in and ought to be ex-
ercised by the legislature. 
IV.  FLORIDA’S STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION 
Florida’s approach to the non-delegation doctrine is largely a positive de-
velopment for those concerned about the separation of powers, but it is not a 
perfect model.  One apparent problem with the Marshall-Askew test is that 
courts must elucidate a legislative policy from a regulatory scheme that might 
be very complicated.  Trying to discern a policy in some situations where there 
is no clear purpose would amount to little more than re-writing the statute to 
find a coherent policy.  In other words, the Marshall-Askew test affords judges 
significant discretion to decide what a statute’s purpose is.  In determining 
whether a legislature made the fundamental and primary policy decision, it 
seems that judges must draw on sources outside of the Constitution and statu-
tory text and, ultimately, make policy judgments themselves.  That opens 
judges up to Justice Souter’s criticism of the majority in United States v. Lopez, 
where he asserted that the Court was returning to the “activism” of the early 
twentieth century249 – there, the Court was resuscitating the long-dead re-
strictions on regulating under the Commerce Clause, so it is a natural parallel 
to the non-delegation doctrine.250 
While such malleable judicial discretion could be a problem, there are 
some easy cases where the Florida method produces results different than what 
current federal jurisprudence would.  National Broadcasting is a clear example 
where Congress made no policy whatsoever.251  American Petroleum Institute 
 
 248. Id. at 21. 
 249. 514 U.S. 549, 605–06 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 250. See id. at 567–68 (majority opinion). 
 251. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943); see also supra 
Part II.A.5. 
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is in some ways a more egregious example because, there, Congress seemingly 
avoided making the fundamental policy choice due to fears of political reper-
cussions for its decision.252  Schiavo is yet another clear example because the 
legislature left the governor with a wholly discretionary decision, and thus the 
legislature made no policy choice at all.253  What distinguishes easy cases like 
National Broadcasting and Schiavo from harder cases is that the former two 
delegated completely discretionary authority.  A bright-line test thus may be 
for a judge to ask whether a certain action and the exact opposite action would 
both be permitted by the statute’s text.  In Schiavo, for example, it was equally 
within the delegation’s scope for the governor to issue the stay as it was for the 
governor not to issue the stay.254  Additionally, there were no findings or guide-
lines that restricted the governor’s discretion.255  Therefore, no reasonable 
judge could say that the statute in Schiavo did not delegate the fundamental and 
primary policy decision to the governor. 
Ultimately, all constitutional provisions require a judicially constructed 
test.  The problem seems to be more acute with the non-delegation doctrine and 
the Marshall-Askew test because deciding what is a fundamental policy choice 
is more political than decisions by courts in other types of cases.  As the Court 
stated in Lopez when confronting the limits of the even-more-malleable Com-
merce Clause test: “These are not precise formulations, and in the nature of 
things they cannot be.”256  Enforcing the non-delegation doctrine requires pru-
dence, just as enforcing any other constitutional provision does.  There is no 
need to single out the non-delegation doctrine for differential treatment when 
the problem of murky standards and possibly inconsistent enforcement applies 
whenever a judge is working with a standard rather than a bright-line rule.  The 
problem is less acute with the Marshall-Askew test because the more compli-
cated a regulatory scheme is, the more deference an agency interpretation is 
entitled to.  The sliding scale test is another discretionary aspect of the test, but 
it can be argued that it makes the test stronger, not weaker, by affording more 
deference where the legislature intends to create a more complex regulatory 
apparatus. 
Florida’s jurisprudence demonstrates that federal courts can have their 
cake and eat it, too, on non-delegation enforcement.  Florida’s approach is not 
rigidly formalistic.  Rather, it allows for judicial discretion and permits a more 
lenient standard depending on the complexity of the regulated subject.  For a 
federal government that has grown increasingly dependent on a sprawling ad-
ministrative state, the Florida approach presents a workable option focused on 
flexibility.  Ultimately, federal courts cannot shirk their duty to enforce the 
 
 252. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 253. Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 334 (Fla. 2004). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). 
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non-delegation doctrine because of concerns about the practical effects of do-
ing so,257 but they can adopt Florida’s sliding scale test to lessen any potential 
problems that might arise from strongly enforcing the separation of powers. 
Following in Florida’s footsteps would not solve all of the problems re-
lating to the non-delegation doctrine, and there is reason to believe that the 
Marshall-Askew test could become as hollow a test as the intelligible principle 
doctrine.  It is not difficult to imagine that the exception carved out in Avatar 
and Southern Alliance will swallow the rule, leaving nearly any subject matter 
delegated to the executive to be deemed too complex and technical to require 
the legislature to enact the generally applicable rules concerning it.  Yet even 
with these obvious problems, Florida’s jurisprudence provides a model for en-
forcing the delegation principle.  Perhaps more importantly, Florida’s jurispru-
dence illustrates that the parade of horribles following any insistence of reviv-
ing the non-delegation doctrine to be illusionary.  At a minimum, Florida 
should be credited for taking a step in the right direction by taking delegation 
concerns seriously.  The state’s jurisprudence has stumbled in its application 
of the doctrine, but, unlike the federal courts, it has not given up its constitu-
tional duty. 
V.  A FEDERAL TOEHOLD: NON-DELEGATION IN THE CRIMINAL 
CONTEXT 
Florida’s approach to enforcing the separation of powers is more faithful 
to the text of the respective constitutions than the current federal approach, but 
it is not entirely faithful.  To fully adhere to the Federal Constitution’s mandate, 
the ideal model is a combination of Florida’s enforcement of the non-delega-
tion doctrine in the criminal context and two opinions by leading federal ap-
pellate court judges who take separation of powers concerns seriously when 
evaluating criminal statutes.  The model reflects Professor Schoenbrod’s qual-
itative approach to defining legislative power that prevents the legislature from 
delegating any of its power to the executive.  As the opinions in this section 
reflect, there is a special need to protect citizens from arbitrary power when 
their life and liberty are at stake.  For that reason, federal courts are more likely 
to find a toehold for resuscitating the non-delegation doctrine in the criminal 
context, rather than civil context, because the stakes of getting the law right are 
so high. 
 
 257. See id.  See also Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 
959 (1983) (“There is no support in the Constitution or decisions of this Court for the 
proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often encountered in complying with 
explicit Constitutional standards may be avoided, either by the Congress or by the Pres-
ident.”). 
37
Kritkos: Resuscitating the Non-Delegation Doctrine
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
478 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
A.  Florida’s Criminal Delegation Enforcement 
Under provisions securing the separation of powers and due process, Flor-
ida courts have held that “criminal statutes must be strictly construed according 
to their letter, and . . . this rule of strict construction emanates from article I, 
section 9 [the due process provision] and article II, section 3 [the separation of 
powers provision] of the Florida Constitution.”258  The Florida Supreme Court 
has further explained that the non-delegation doctrine is directly at issue in 
broad criminal delegations because “the power to create crimes and punish-
ments in derogation of the common law inheres solely in the democratic pro-
cesses of the legislative branch.”259 
In B.H., the defendant challenged a statute that made escaping from any 
secure detention facility of restrictiveness level VI or above a third degree fel-
ony.260  Restrictiveness levels were not defined in the statute.261  Rather, the 
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services had the power to define the 
levels.262  The only standards or guidance provided in the statute were that 
“there shall be no more than eight levels.”263  The Florida Supreme Court con-
cluded that the statute violated both the due process provision and the separa-
tion of powers provision of the Florida Constitution.264  Those two provisions 
require that a statute itself provide “adequate notice of the prohibited con-
duct.”265  Admitting that no “single bright-line test” could apply to all non-
delegation challenges, the court emphasized the unique context of criminal 
law: “The delegation of authority to define a crime, for example, is of such a 
different magnitude from noncriminal cases that more stringent rules and 
greater scrutiny certainly is required.” 266 
The Court rightly found there to be no “meaningful limitations” on the 
Department’s ability to define crimes.267  The Department did not have to de-
fine any restrictiveness level below a VI, which would mean escaping any com-
mitment facility would qualify as a severe felony.268  Nor did it have to define 
any restrictiveness level at or above a VI, in which case the law would effec-
tively be null because it would be impossible to commit the crime.269 
 
 258. Jeffries v. State, 610 So. 2d 440, 441 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam). 
 259. B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987, 992 (Fla. 1994) (per curiam) (quoting Perkins 
v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310, 1312 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam)). 
 260. Id. at 989. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 989–90. 
 263. Id. at 990 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.01(61) (Supp. 1990)). 
 264. Id. at 993–94. 
 265. Id. at 993. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 994. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
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B.  Carter and Nichols 
Two recent decisions by federal judges have acknowledged the potential 
for enforcing the non-delegation doctrine in the criminal context.270  In Carter, 
the Sixth Circuit held that a policy statement promulgated by the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development was not entitled to deference and thus was 
not binding on the defendants in the case.271  If the policy statement were bind-
ing, the defendants would have been subject to criminal prohibitions.272  Judge 
Jeffrey Sutton, in a concurring opinion, relied upon the rule of lenity to negate 
the typical deference accorded to an administrative agency.273  As part of the 
rule of lenity analysis, Judge Sutton argued that federalism arguments may 
have special weight in the criminal context.274  Singling out the non-delegation 
doctrine as especially relevant, Judge Sutton wrote that “[t]he Supreme Court 
has suggested that ‘greater congressional specificity [may be] required in the 
criminal context.’”275  He further submitted that “the Constitution may well 
also require Congress to state more than an ‘intelligible principle’ when leaving 
the definition of crime to the executive.”276  The rule of lenity and due process 
concerns, when coupled with the independent non-delegation arguments, 
should be sufficient to persuade federal courts to develop a more stringent test, 
like the Marshall-Askew test, when a delegation challenge arises in the criminal 
context. 
Like Judge Sutton, then-Judge Neil Gorsuch acknowledged the delega-
tion problems presented in a criminal statute,277 namely section 16913(d) of the 
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) – while dissenting 
from a failed petition to rehear a case en banc.278  As might be deduced from 
its name, the Act requires sex offenders to register their location or face crim-
inal penalties.279  For sex offenders convicted after the SORNA was enacted, 
the requirements are set out over twenty-two pages.280  But for those convicted 
 
 270. Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 724, 734 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(Sutton, J., concurring); United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 670, 676–77 (10th Cir. 
2015) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 271. Carter, 736 F.3d at 724. 
 272. Id. at 725. 
 273. Id. at 729 (Sutton, J., concurring). 
 274. Id. at 733–34. 
 275. Id. at 734 (second alteration in original) (quoting Touby v. United States, 500 
U.S. 160, 166 (1991)).  Judge Sutton also referred to Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 
414, 423–27 (1944), as another source of authority on the matter.  Carter, 736 F.3d. at 
734 (Sutton, J., concurring). 
 276. Carter, 736 F.3d at 734 (Sutton, J., concurring). 
 277. United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 672 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 278. Id. at 667–77; 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) (2012). 
 279. §§ 16913(a), (e). 
 280. Nichols, 784 F.3d at 668 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
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before, the Attorney General has the authority to determine whether the re-
quirements apply and, if so, which requirements will apply to which offend-
ers.281  Judge Gorsuch highlighted the centrality that the constitutional Framers 
placed on separating lawmaking and law enforcement functions, especially in 
the context of criminal law.282  Moreover, criminal penalties are the “ultimate 
intrusion[]” on liberty, carrying “the stigma of the community’s collective con-
demnation,” and thus justifying a stricter inquiry.283  Overcriminalization also 
elevates the need for effective judicial enforcement of the separation of pow-
ers.284 
Like Judge Sutton, Judge Gorsuch relied on Touby as precedent for 
stricter criminal delegation enforcement.  Specifically, Judge Gorsuch distilled 
three delegation limitations from Touby: (1) Congress provides a clear and gen-
erally applicable rule; (2) the executive makes a factual determination; and (3) 
the executive makes its finding based on the criteria provided in the statute.285  
The features of the delegation – that the nation’s top prosecutor was effectively 
tasked with creating a new crime to be applied to half a million people in count-
less possible ways – required more congressional direction than other situa-
tions.286  The SORNA delegation contained none of the Touby limitations, so 
Judge Gorsuch indicated that he would have invalidated it.287 
The Touby limitations provide a requirement for true contingent legisla-
tion.  For that reason, Judge Gorsuch’s formulation satisfies the strictures of 
Professor Schoenbrod’s test because Congress is providing the rules, and the 
executive is merely executing them.  There can be some debate about whether 
Schoenbrod would approve of Judge Gorsuch’s delegation test, as a lot of work 
is being put on the requirement that Congress establish criteria in the statute 
that restrict the executive’s discretion.  But the requirement that the executive 
make a factual determination indicates that the rules are set and the executive 
merely determines what actions fit within the rules.  In short, Judge Gorsuch 
has proposed a non-delegation test that would comport with early federal del-
egation history and satisfy the separation of powers concern of Professors Law-
son and Schoenbrod.  And Judge Gorsuch has provided persuasive reasons why 
the test should be applied in the criminal context, despite the Supreme Court’s 
seeming lack of interest to fully enforce the separation of powers when consid-
ering civil statutes. 
 
 281. § 16913(d). 
 282. Nichols, 784 F.3d at 670 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc). 
 283. Id. at 672–73. 
 284. See id. at 673. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 674, 676. 
 287. Id. at 676. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Even accepting that one of the tests described above would resolve the 
two major doubts about enforcing the doctrine, one might ask why the non-
delegation doctrine is worth resuscitating.  Some might argue that courts are 
merely deferring to the democratically elected legislature in upholding broad 
delegations.  But that deference comes at a price – namely, shifting the balance 
of power among the three branches.  Others might respond that Congress could 
simply write narrower statutes if it wanted to guard its powers.  As the Supreme 
Court has noted, however, “The fact that one institution of Government has 
mechanisms available to guard against incursions into its power by other gov-
ernmental institutions does not require that the judiciary remove itself from the 
controversy.”288  Moreover, “[l]iberty is always at stake when one or more of 
the branches seek to transgress the separation of powers . . . [and, therefore, 
t]hat a congressional cession of power is voluntary does not make it innocu-
ous.”289 
The non-delegation doctrine is what ensures the first three articles of the 
Constitution are not blended together when it might be expedient to do so.  Ar-
bitrary power arises when power, rather than being discretely parceled out, is 
concentrated and amalgamated.290  The Constitution “impose[s] burdens on 
governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, 
but those hard choices were consciously made by men who had lived under a 
form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go un-
checked.”291  Preventing Congress from avoiding its duty to be the lawmaking 
branch ensures that the ultimate check on the federal government – the will of 
the people – remains because the lines of accountability between lawmakers 
and citizens will be clear.  The judiciary has admirably enforced other doctrines 
of the separation of powers, but it should recommit to enforcing the non-dele-
gation doctrine by adopting the Marshall-Askew test or at least strictly apply 
the doctrine when a delegation permits the use of legislative power to create a 
crime. 
Adopting either test is a limited approach to resuscitating the non-delega-
tion doctrine.  The Marshall-Askew test is a compromise solution between for-
malists like Professors Lawson and Schoenbrod and Justice Thomas and the 
non-enforcement of the current federal approach.  The virtues of that test are 
that it provides for judicial discretion and flexibility when analyzing delegation 
challenges.  Of course, the flip side of those benefits is also the test’s vices.  
 
 288. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 393 (1990). 
 289. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450, 452 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 290. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same 
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elec-
tive, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”). 
 291. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). 
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But those vices can be overcome as a wealth of case law builds up that cabins 
judicial discretion and that ensures the complex and technical subject matter 
exception does not become the default characterization of legislation.  The for-
malist approach taken in Florida and advocated by Judges Sutton and Gorsuch 
for delegation challenges in the criminal context also has its pros and cons.  The 
benefits include faithful adherence to the text of the Constitution and the fun-
damental separation of powers principles that are especially vital to govern-
mental legitimacy when life and personal liberty are at stake.  Yet the negative 
aspect to adopting that approach in the criminal context would be to effectively 
admit that the judiciary is interpreting the same words of the Constitution to 
mean two different things, depending on the subject of the delegation – possi-
bly undermining the legitimacy of constitutional interpretation. 
Though neither approach is perfect, the one more faithful to the separation 
of powers principles embedded within the Constitution requires strongly en-
forcing the non-delegation doctrine in the criminal context.  First, the govern-
ment’s power to deprive citizens of their life and liberty is the most significant 
power wielded by the State.  Accordingly, and as recognized by the rule of 
lenity, the government should not be allowed to wade into the gray area when 
criminal penalties are at issue.  Rather, the government’s authority to enforce 
criminal penalties should be entirely clear, so that the legitimacy of the gov-
ernment’s actions is beyond question.  As has been shown, there is at least 
doubt about whether the current federal jurisprudence concerning delegation 
accurately reflects the text and history of the Constitution.  Eighty years of 
precedent might be enough of a reason to decline enforcing the non-delegation 
doctrine in civil matters, but stare decisis is a poor excuse to allow liberty to 
be taken away when no legislative enactment sanctions it.  Second, enforcing 
the non-delegation doctrine in the criminal context would be a limited experi-
ment to test whether judges could develop coherent case law concerning the 
limits of the doctrine.  If federal judges find that enforcing the delegation prin-
ciple is not impractical and does not frustrate the aims of Congress and the 
American people, then the endeavor could be expanded to the civil context as 
well.  But if enforcing the non-delegation doctrine turns out to be as unworka-
ble as the Supreme Court has feared, then the project can be either abandoned 
or limited to an area where delegation is less prominent. 
Limiting the doctrine’s enforcement to the criminal context is also the 
way that reviving it is most likely to happen.  Both liberal and conservative 
scholars and jurists should favor adhering to strict non-delegation principles in 
the criminal context.  For liberals, there is greater protection of criminal de-
fendants from the power of prosecutors.  And for conservatives, fidelity to the 
text of the Constitution is an inherent good.  Thus, from either a functionalist 
or formalist viewpoint, not permitting the executive to prescribe rules of gen-
eral applicability in the criminal context would yield net benefits.  Both indi-
vidual freedom and the rule of law would profit the change in jurisprudence – 
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